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Executive Summary  
The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases to protect public 
health and welfare. Currently the agency is in the process of developing standards for existing coal 
power plants under section 111(d) of the CAA and are expected to issue the proposed rule this summer. 
These regulations have the potential to drastically reduce emissions in the United States. Of the policy 
proposals and recommendations that have been submitted to the EPA, most advocate for including 
flexibility mechanisms, such as emissions trading, crediting and offsets, in the guidance policy.  However, 
such broad mechanisms have limited precedence under 111(d) and their legality is untested.  
This paper explores a more conservative approach by regulating coal units within-the-fence-line. 
Specifically, the proposed policy would require uniform mandatory heat rate reductions for all coal 
units, regardless of initial heat rate.  All coal units would be required to lower heat rates by 740-810 
Btu/kWh, resulting in an 8% fleet-wide average. Inefficient units would be allowed to continue to 
operate alongside more efficient ones as long as each reduces their heat rate by the given amount.  
The policy was modeled and this analysis finds that despite costs associated with installing heat-rate 
reducing technology, costs to plant operators and consumers are reduced. This is mainly due to the 
decreases in fuel costs that accompany the efficiency improvements. As a result, it is more economical 
for many coal plants to operate. US generation from coal increases 4% relative to a reference and 
electricity prices per kWh decrease. Costs associated with the policy do force some coal units into 
retirement. An additional 4.3 GW of coal capacity and 50 coal units are retired compared to the 4.4 GW 
that are expected to retire absent any policy. However, the units that close operate at low or zero 
capacity and specific regions are not disproportionally affected over others. 
Carbon emissions are reduced by 68 megatons the first year that the policy goes into effect relative to 
the reference scenario and avoids 1,284 Mt of cumulative carbon emission over the lifetime of the 
analysis (2016-2030). However, overall, the policy does not force any changes in electrical generation. 
No new low-carbon resources are built as a result of the policy. Therefore, total emissions continue to 
rise through the end of the analysis as the economy grows. Despite starting below 2005 levels, 
emissions increase to 4.3% above 2005 levels by 2030. 
Overall, the policy represents a less ambitious course of action to reduce carbon emissions from coal 
power plants but still allows reductions to take place at low economic costs and would likely stand up to 
challenges in court. While it is unlikely that the EPA will chose such a limited approach to regulating coal 
plants under 111(d), the proposed policy could serve as a sound option if other alternatives fail. 
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Introduction  
The week of May 26, 2013, the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii reached a striking milestone. For the 
first time ever, the weekly average carbon dioxide concentration hit 400 ppm, ushering us into a new 
and unprecedented echelon. 1 In March of 2014, concentrations again rose above 400 ppm.2 It is 
apparent that this will soon become the norm. Record high concentrations have coincided with the 
warmest years and decades in human history,3 a correlation that is beyond debate. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which will publish the last installments of the Fifth 
Assessment Report in 2014, issued strong statements regarding human influence on the climate system 
and noted that the world is already experiencing the catastrophic impacts of climate change.4  
Despite the imperative to curb emissions, comprehensive attempts have been stalled. To date, countries 
have been unable to agree to an international agreement. Domestically, the United States came close to 
passing a cap-and-trade program in 2010 but ultimately failed. As grander attempts have come up short, 
all eyes have turned to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Agency is required under the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) to regulate carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases, but until recently, it has been slow 
to move forward with regulation to address the largest sources of the pollutant. But this has changed in 
the past two years. In the coming months, the agency will release its draft proposal for regulating 
carbon dioxide from coal power plants, a policy that has the potential to lead to significant reductions. 
Last year, on June 25, 2013, President Obama presented his Presidential Climate Action Plan aimed at 
taking concrete actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and prepare America for the harmful 
effects of climate change. 5 Specifically, his executive order instructed the EPA to move forward 
“expeditiously” to develop standards for US coal power plants.  
                                                          
1
 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), “Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide: Up-to-date 
weekly average CO2 at Mauna Loa – Week beginning on March 30, 2014,” (accessed on April 9, 2014), 
http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/weekly.html.  
2
 Ibid. 
3
 According to NOAA, 2013 was the fourth hottest year on record. See 
NOAA, “National Climatic Data Center: Global Analysis – Annual 2013,” (accessed on April 9, 2014), 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/2013/13.  
4
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Press Release: A changing climate creates pervasive risks but 
opportunities exist for effective responses,” (March 31, 2014), 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ar5/pr_wg2/140330_pr_wgII_spm_en.pdf 
5
 White House, “The President’s Climate Action Plan,” (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf. 
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Coal power plants contribute 31% of domestic carbon dioxide emissions6 while providing 32% of the 
total electricity.7 But the amount of reductions that can result from regulating these entities largely 
depends on the stringency and comprehensiveness of the EPA’s rule. Already, various non-profits, think 
tanks, and trade groups have submitted recommendations to the EPA for how to draft its rule. These 
proposals have ranged from market-based systems to more traditional command-and-control 
standards. Some have included provisions that allow crediting and offsets while others only regulate 
within-the-fence-line. Each proposal has its benefits and drawbacks – legally, economically, and in terms 
of emissions reductions. This paper explores a policy that regulates emissions from coal-power plants 
“within-the-fence-line,” meaning that flexibility mechanisms such as renewable energy offsets, tradable 
standards, or end-use efficiency credits are not included. The policy proposed here requires a 
mandatory heat rate reduction for all coal plants in the United States, based on current available 
technology. While similar to other traditional command-and-control approaches, this proposal differs 
because it does not provide a baseline for plants to meet, but rather requires blanket reductions 
regardless of a unit’s initial heat-rate. The policy is assessed to determine the economic and 
environmental impacts that would result if the agency took such an approach. 
Background 
In 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases qualify as air 
pollutants under the Clean Air Act and that the EPA must regulate them if they pose a threat to public 
health and well-being.8 In the case Massachusetts vs EPA, the petitioners argued that the agency was 
not fulfilling its duties to protect the public from harm caused by climate change. The agency conducted 
a scientific analysis and released a report titled the “Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for 
Greenhouse Gases,” which concluded that greenhouse gases harm public health.9 This finding made 
regulation of the pollutants a requirement and promulgated a series of actions by the agency to reduce 
                                                          
6
 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Sector and Source, 
United States,” (accessed on March 3, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/tablebrowser/. 
7
 EIA, “Annual Energy Outlook Early Release,” (December 16, 2013), 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/early_elecgen.cfm. 
8
 Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 549 U. S. 497 (2007), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-1120.pdf. 
9
 EPA, “Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean 
Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 239 (December 15, 2009), 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/endangerment/Federal_Register-EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0171-
Dec.15-09.pdf. 
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emissions. In 2011, the EPA finalized emissions standards for cars and trucks and is in the process of 
developing standards for stationary sources.10  
Despite the regulatory requirements, tackling greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act is a 
challenge. No one denies the fact that the law was not designed to regulate carbon dioxide. The 
pollutant, which is generated from all parts of the economy, has a long residence time in the 
atmosphere, mixes globally, and also comes from international sources. Furthermore, there are multiple 
potential avenues to regulate under the CAA. In some sections of the law, wording is broad and could be 
interpreted as applying to carbon dioxide. For instance, the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) program sets pollutant concentrations to ensure adequate margin of safety for the public.11 
Carbon dioxide may qualify as one of the criteria pollutants regulated under NAAQS but such an 
approach would be stringent and impossible for states to meet attainment.12 Another option would be 
under Section 115 which allows the EPA Administrator to regulate a pollutant coming from the United 
States if it endangers the public health and welfare of a foreign country.13 However, because this section 
has never been used since the Clean Air Act was passed in 1970, it is unlikely that the EPA would be able 
to justify such broad usage now.14 
Weighing the legal authority and feasibility, the EPA chose to move forward under section 111 which 
applies to stationary sources of air pollutants. In September 2013, the EPA released a proposal for 
limiting carbon dioxide from new stationary sources.  The rule, called a New Source Performance 
Standard (NSPS), requires coal and natural gas units yet to be built to meet a specific emissions rate 
based on the commercially available control technology. Specifically, new coal plants would have to 
meet a rate of 1,000-1,100 lbs/MWh in order to receive permission to be built.15 While new source 
regulations do nothing to address the 1,264 existing coal power units,16 it is an important procedural 
                                                          
10
 40 C.F.R §600 (2011). 
11
 EPA, “National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS),” (accessed on April 18, 2014), 
http://www.epa.gov/air/criteria.html. 
12
 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., “Federal Control of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: What are the Options?," Boston College 
Environmental Affairs Law Review 36(1): 2009, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol36/iss1/1. 
13
 42 U.S.C §7415 
14
 Burtraw, Dallas, Arthur G. Fraas, and Nathan Richardson, “Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Clean Air Act: A 
guide for economists,” Resources for the Future (February 2011). 
15 EPA, “EPA Technical Fact Sheet: Reducing Carbon Pollution from Power Plants,” (September 20, 2013), 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/. 
production/files/2013-09/documents/20130920technicalfactsheet.pdf. 
16
 EPIS, Inc., “AURORAxmp Electric Market Model (Version 11.2.1001),” [Software], (2013). 
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step to allow the agency to move forward with restrictions on existing sources17 which falls under 
section 111(d) of the CAA. The law stipulates that existing source regulations only apply to the same 
category of sources regulated by new source performance standards.18 Coal electrical generating units 
classify as a category so the EPA can only regulate them once NSPS have been finalized. It may not apply 
an existing source standard, for instance, to fuel oil electrical generators because it has not established a 
NSPS for that source. This is an important distinction that may limit the scope of what the EPA can 
regulate under 111(d).  
The statute requires that the Administrator implement the “best system of emission reduction” that has 
been “adequately demonstrated,”19 but what this means is heavily debated. A characteristic of the CAA 
is that it establishes the framework for regulation but in many sections contains intentionally broad 
language to give the agency some discretion when designing rules. There is no uniform policy design 
that the EPA uses for all its air quality regulations since the individual characteristics of each air pollutant 
and its sources are unique. Regulating carbon monoxide requires a policy approach that is very different 
from the approach for curtailing ozone pollution, even when both are regulated under NAAQS. For 
instance, carbon monoxide (CO) comes from inefficient combustion of mobile sources whereas ozone is 
a secondary pollutant that results from the reaction of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), nitrogen 
oxides, and sunlight. CO is more easily managed by regulating combustion engines and tailpipes whereas 
ozone requires more complex approaches targeting VOCs, combustion temperatures, and other factors. 
These characteristics influence the strategies that the EPA and states have used to limit ozone and CO.  
For stationary sources, the EPA has similarly tailored rules to achieve the “best system of emission 
reduction” but it is still unclear how this phrase would apply to carbon dioxide emissions. Economically, 
the best system of emission reduction might include market-based trading between sources, and many 
academics and trade organizations have argued that the EPA should move forward with such an 
approach. Under other parts of the CAA, such as the Acid Deposition Program, market-based trading has 
been “adequately demonstrated” to be economically efficient and an effective tool of emission 
reduction. However, 111(d) has not been used often so the legality of how broad the EPA can interpret 
the phrase is widely untested, particularly for something as broad as carbon emissions from coal power 
                                                          
17
 Tarr, Jeremy, “The Clean Air Act and Power Sector Carbon Standards: Basics of section 111(d),” Nicholas Institute 
(September 2013), http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_pb_13-03.pdf. 
18
 42 U.S.C§7411(d) 
19
 42 U.S.C §7411(a)(1) 
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plants.20 Whenever 111(d) has been triggered, the EPA has usually opted for traditional, uniform 
standards. In few circumstances, the agency permitted trading emission credits across sources under 
111(d). For instance, the EPA allowed municipal solid waste plants to trade nitrogen oxide emissions.21 
For these reasons, other academics and organizations have argued that a more traditional interpretation 
of the standard would be more appropriate in this case, particularly since any rule regarding carbon 
emissions will get challenged in court. The more traditional interpretation would limit the scope and is 
referred to as a “within-the-fence-line” approach. Regulating within-the-fence-line prevents the EPA 
from allowing credits, averaging, or trading and must only apply to the individual units.  
Both Resources for the Future (RFF) and the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) advocate for 
broader interpretations of “best system” that are more economically efficient and more comprehensive. 
RFF reviewed several policy scenarios of increasing flexibility. 22 The first was a strict standard on coal 
plants that allows trading between units. The second applies to all fossil fuel generators and allows 
trading between the sources. The final scenario expands flexibility by allowing credits and trading for 
nuclear and renewable sources. In all scenarios, units exceeding the standard were allowed to purchase 
emission credits from those under-emitting. As flexibility increased, the marginal abatement cost 
decreased to support the theory that broader policies are more economically-efficient. However, the 
paper found that increasing flexibility did not necessarily lead to greater emissions reductions.  
NRDC developed a proposal that sets state-specific emissions standards (pounds of carbon dioxide per 
kWh) for existing coal power plants.23  The proposal bases the standards on each state’s electrical 
generation portfolio. States with larger coal generation would be granted a higher emissions rate than 
states with large natural gas generation. This allows coal-heavy states some initial leniency. However, 
over time, the metric changes and the emission rate is reduced so that coal heavy states would be 
required to make more significant reductions. NRDC recommends allowing credits for end-use energy 
efficiency, a form of flexibility in-line with a broader interpretation of “best system.” Demand-side 
energy efficiency measures, such as weatherizing houses, and replacing old appliances are low-cost 
                                                          
20
 Tarr, Jeremy, Jonas Monast, and Tim Profeta, “Regulating Carbon Dioxide under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air 
Act: Options, limits, and impacts,” Nicholas Institute (January 2013), 
http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_r_13-01.pdf. 
21
 40 C.F.R §60.33(b) 
22
 Burtraw, Dallas, and Matt Woerman, “Technology Flexibility and Stringency for Greenhouse Gas Regulations,” 
Resources of the Future (July 2013), http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-13-24.pdf. 
23
 Lashof, Daniel A., Starla Yeh, David Doniger, Sheryl Carter, and Laurie Johnson, “Closing the Power Plant Carbon 
Pollution Loophole,” Natural Resources Defense Council (March 2013), http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution-
standards/files/pollution-standards-report.pdf. 
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options for power plants to reduce emissions and have an added benefit of saving consumers money.24 
The inclusion of demand-side or end-use energy efficiency is something that the EPA has not done 
through 111(d) before.   
Additionally, many states support a more flexible approach because they already have implemented 
similar carbon reduction policies, such as renewable portfolio standards, end-use efficiency programs, 
planned plant retirements, and greenhouse gas trading markets.25 Most Northeastern states are part of 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which is a utility-only carbon dioxide trading market.26 
California has a cap-and-trade market for utilities, refineries, and major industrial emitters.27 To avoid 
redundancy, a coalition of these states argues that 111(d) carbon standards should allow crediting for 
these programs.28 
Despite the popularity of flexibility, it is still unclear whether the EPA has the authority to allow for such 
approaches. 111(d) has clear language that the rule must only apply to sources regulated by new source 
standards of performance29 which would exclude any “outside-the-fenceline” approaches. Even while 
touting the economic efficiency of the tradable standard, Dallas Burtraw of RFF recognizes that there is a 
trade-off between greater flexibility and greater legal risk30 particularly given the limited precedent 
under 111(d). Several states have proposed that the EPA should take a more traditional approach. 
Texas31, West Virginia32, and North Carolina33, to name a few, have all submitted requests in line with 
this.  
                                                          
24
 McKinsey and Company, “Energy Efficiency: A compelling global resource,” (2010). 
25
 Monast, Jonas, et al., “Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Sources: Section 
111(d) and State Equivalency,” Environmental Law Reporter 42 (2012): 10206-10215. 
26
 Information available about the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Inc. online at http://www.rggi.org/. 
27
 California Air Resources Board, “Cap-and-Trade Program,” (last updated March 28, 2014), 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm. 
28
 “Comments of the Attorneys General of New York, California, Massachusetts, Delaware, New Mexico, Oregon, 
Washington, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Rhode Island, Vermont, District of Columbia on the design of a 
program to reduce carbon pollution from existing power plants,” (December 22, 2013), 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Environment.pdf. 
29
 42 U.S.C§7411(d) 
30
 Burtraw, “Technology Flexibility.” 
31
 Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, “Comments on CO2 emissions for EGUs, Section 111(d) of the Clean 
Air Act,” (January 14, 2014), 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/static.texastribune.org/media/documents/TCEQ_PUC_GHG_existing_plants_response_t
o_EPA_Jan_17_14.pdf. 
32
 West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection, “West Virginia’s Principles to Consider in Establishing 
Carbon Dioxide Emission Guidelines for Existing Power Plants,” (February 20, 2014), 
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Keeping in mind that any proposal will be challenged in court, a more cautious and legally sound 
approach might be wise. This paper explores a traditional “within-the-fenceline” standard as is proposed 
below.  
Policy Simulation and Methods  
Policy Description 
The proposed policy would require mandatory heat rate reductions for all coal power plants in the 
United States. 34 The heat rate reductions would be categorized by unit size but uniform regardless of 
the initial heat rate. Units less than or equal to 200 Megawatts (MW) must reduce heat rates by 810 
British Thermal Units per kilowatt-hour (Btu/kWh), units less than or equal to 500 MW must reduce heat 
rates by 745 Btu/kWh, and units greater than 500 MW must reduce heat rates by 740 Btu/kWh. If 
implemented across the entire fleet, this would equate to an average heat rate reduction of 8%. 
While some proposed policies, such as the NRDC proposal, have focused on emission rates, this analysis 
uses heat rates as an equivalent proxy. In fossil fuel units, the net heat rate is directly correlated with 
the amount of carbon dioxide emitted.35 The higher the heat rate, the more coal must be burned to 
produce the same amount of electricity. A one percent improvement in the heat rate reduces fuel use 
by one percent and results in reducing carbon emissions by one percent.36 Coal-fired power plants in the 
United States require on average 10,400 British thermal units (Btu) to produce one kilowatthour (kWh) 
of electrical energy, but range from heat rates of 5,000 Btu/kWh to 32,779 Btu/kWh.37 The proposed 
policy would improve the efficiency to a fleet-wide average of 9,505 Btu/kWh.  
The heat rate reductions used in the main policy scenario are the central values of a range of possible 
heat rate reductions spanning from 355 Btu/kWh to 1,265 Btu/kWh (4% and 15% fleet-wide average 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.governor.wv.gov/Documents/WVDEP%20Principles%20for%20Existing%20EGU%20CO2%20Regulation
.pdf. 
33
 North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources, “North Carolina §111(d) Principles,” (January 
27, 2014), http://daq.state.nc.us/rules/EGUs/NC_111d_Principles.pdf. 
34 In a white paper, Joshua Linn conducted an econometric analysis of a uniform heat rate standard for coal units 
but did not use an electrical dispatching model and differs from the policy and subsequent analysis presented 
here. For more information see: 
Joshua Linn, “Regulating Greenhouse Gases from Coal Power Plants under the Clean Air Act,” (February 2013).  
35
 EPA, “Technical Support Document for Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Greenhouse Gases; 
Stationary Sources, Section VII,” (June 2008), 16. 
36
 Ibid., 16. 
37
 Sargent and Lundy, “Coal-Fired Power Plant Heat Rate Reductions,” (January 22, 2009), 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/resource/docs/coalfired.pdf. 
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reductions respectively). These values are based on what is technologically feasible according to 
published literature, which are discussed in greater detail below.  The policy would take effect in 2016 
and will be assessed its emission reductions, costs, and distributional effects. 
Data and Technology Assumptions  
The possible reductions used in this model are based on technology documented in a report conducted 
by Sargent and Lundy, LLC in 2009 for Perrin Quarles Associates, Inc.38 The report compiles existing 
technology that could be installed to meet the heat rate reduction requirements for coal-fired power 
plants. These technologies include: 
 Economizers that capture heat escaping in flue gas 
 Neural networks of computer processors and software to optimize plant operation 
 Intelligent sootblowers to prevent ash buildup 
 Air heaters and ducts that are better at preventing air leakage 
 Acid dew point controls to allow lower air heater output temperatures 
 New turbines 
 Condenser maintenance to prevent particulate build-up 
 Efficient boiler feed pumps  
 Induced draft fans with variable frequency drives 
 Efficiency improvements to environmental emissions control technologies. 
Two additional studies were reviewed but did not provide the level of detail that Sargent and Lundy 
provides.39 Sargent and Lundy relied on existing literature, interviews, and engineering expertise to 
develop the suite of technologies, technology costs, and associated heat rate reductions. All capital costs 
and operation and maintenance costs presented were current as of 2008. Data from the report was 
extracted to estimate the total capital costs, fixed operation and maintenance costs, variable costs, and 
heat rate reductions for the technologies on three different coal unit sizes (200 MW, 500 MW, 900 MW) 
which are presented in Appendix 1. Capital costs for a 200 MW unit range from $14.35-$29.85 million, 
whereas a 900 MW unit would incur costs between $38.45-$83.55 million. It is assumed that cost 
estimates and heat rate improvements relating to the 200 MW unit would apply to U.S coal units with 
                                                          
38
 Ibid. 
39
 National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), “Improving the Thermal Efficiency of Coal-Fired Power Plants in 
the United States,” US Department of Energy (DOE) (February 25, 2010).  
    NETL, “Opportunities to Improve the Efficiency of Existing Coal-Fired Power Plants,” (July 16, 2009).  
12 
 
capacities less than or equal to 200 MW. Similarly, costs and heat rates for the 500 MW unit would apply 
to those less than or equal to 500 MW and greater than 200 MW, and the cost estimates for the 900 
MW unit would apply to any greater than 500 MW. A summary of these costs are displayed in Table 1. 
These costs need to be modified prior to their use in any modeling, which is discussed in the next 
section. 
Table 1: Summary of Retrofit Heat Rate Reductions and Costs 
Unit Size Heat Rate 
Reduction 
(Btu/kWh) 
Capital Cost                 
($ million) 
Fixed Operation and 
Maintenance ($/year) 
Variable Cost      
($/year) 
200 MW 355 – 1,265 $14.35 - $29.85 $305,000 - $505,000 $195,000 - $375,000 
500 MW 335 – 1,155 $24.85 - $56.05 $448,000 - $795,000 $485,000 - $910,000 
900 MW 305 – 1,105 $38.45 - $83.55 $590,000 - $111,0000 $850,000 - $1,600,000 
 
It should be noted that, while Sargent and Lundy attempts to be exhaustive, some opportunities for 
efficiency improvement were not included in their study and therefore, not included in this report. 
Sargent and Lundy excluded modifications related to the handling of coal and coal ash in its analysis 
since systems would not yield significant heat rate reductions and are cost prohibitive.40 Feedwater 
heaters, which are used to preheat feedwater prior to entering the boiler, were excluded for the same 
reasons.41 Water treatment technology for boiler water was not included since most coal plants already 
have the most advanced technology installed.42 Regarding the flue gas system, axial and centrifugal fans 
can provide better efficiency for a plant depending on whether it provides base-load or peak power.43 It 
is difficult to predict the specific capacity of each plant but each fan has comparable costs and heat rate 
reductions. Therefore, the minimum and maximum values between the two types were included in the 
input data.  
                                                          
40
 Sargent and Lundy, “Coal-Fired,” 2-2. 
41
 Ibid., 3.2. 
42
 Ibid., 6-2. 
43
 Ibid., 4-2. 
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Model and Scenarios  
The model used in this study was AURORAxmp, an electrical forecasting model developed by EPIS, Inc.44 
AURORA contains a database of the 13,600 generating units in 115 market areas in North America. Its 
database includes the capacities, fuel costs, heat rates, emission costs, and regional demands for each of 
these units. When conducting an analysis, AURORA optimizes demand while minimizing cost. When 
analyzing costs over long-terms, the model not only minimizes electrical dispatching costs but also 
assesses the economics of the plants as a whole and can decide whether to retire old resources or add 
new ones. This analysis ran long-term optimization models from 2013 through 2030 for all electrical 
generating units in the United States Eastern Interconnection to assess the environmental and economic 
impacts of the policy. Figure 1 displays the Eastern Interconnection. The model balanced dispatching 
every 4 hours on the 2nd Tuesday of every month. It is assumed that 100% of coal units would comply 
effective January 1, 2016. 
 
Figure 1: Electricity Grids of the United States and Canada
45
 
While any policy implemented by the EPA would apply uniformly across the United States, the analysis 
only modeled the Eastern Interconnection. This was for time constraints but is sufficient for several 
reasons. Of the 1,264 coal units in the United States, 1,099 are in the Eastern Interconnection, 
accounting for 84% of the total US coal-fired electrical generation.46  Within the Eastern Interconnection, 
                                                          
44
 EPIS, Inc., “AURORAxmp Electric Market Model (Version 11.2.1001),” [Software], (2013). 
45
 Image from National Academies Press, “America’s Energy Future: Technology and Transformation,” (2009), 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12091&page=568. 
46
 Eastern Interconnection States’ Planning Council, “Current State and Future Direction of Coal-fired Power in the 
Eastern Interconnection,” (June 2013), http://naruc.org/Grants/Documents/Final-ICF-Project-Report071213.pdf. 
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coal accounts for greater than 50% of generation for the four of the six reliability regions: the Midwest 
Reliability Corporation, the Regional First Corporation, the SERC Reliability Corporation, and the 
Southwest Power Pool.47 In total, 78% of carbon emissions from electrical generation come from sources 
in the Eastern Interconnection.48 For these reasons, modeling the Eastern Interconnection not only 
provides a good basis for what would be expected in other grids but captures the effects on the vast 
majority of coal plants in the United States. The Eastern Interconnection includes power markets in 
Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan (Figure 1) that would not be regulated under a U.S.  
standard. Therefore coal power plants in Canada were not modified to comply with the policy. However, 
they were included in the electrical dispatching, an important element if policy makers are concerned 
about emission leakage to Canada.   
The report explores six policy scenarios assuming different costs and efficiency improvements, including 
a basecase scenario, a policy scenario, and four side scenarios. The side-scenarios were developed to 
test sensitivity to uncertainty regarding efficiency improvements and costs. These scenarios are 
explained in detail below. 
Basecase Scenario -  The basecase scenario is a reference case against which to compare the 
policy scenarios. It includes emission costs associated with the Clean Air Interstate Rule and 
carbon dioxide prices under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, but does not include any 
quota requirements as part of state Renewable Portfolio Standards nor any costs associated 
with compliance for the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS). 49 The MATS standards were 
finalized in 2011 and will go into effect in 201550 and are predicted to have significant impacts 
on the coal industry.51 However, the individual compliance costs for MATS depends on the type 
of coal a plant uses, how much it burns, its efficiency, and the types emission control technology 
already installed. While excluding MATS is problematic, attempting to capture MATS costs per 
unit would be very difficult absent detailed information about each coal unit. This is likely the 
                                                          
47
 EPA, “Emissions and Generation Resource Integrated Database (eGrid): Eighth edition with 2009 data,” (May 10, 
2012), http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-resources/egrid/. 
48
 EPA, “eGrid.” 
49
 EPA, “Mercury and Air Toxics Standards: Basic Information,” (last updated April 10, 2012), 
http://epa.gov/mats/basic.html. 
50
 Macedonia, Jennifer, Joe Kruger, Lourdes Long, and Meghan McGuinness, “Environmental Regulation and 
Electric System Reliability,” Bipartisan Policy Center (June 13, 2011), 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/BPC%20Electric%20System%20Reliability.pdf. 
51
 EIA, “Today in Energy: AEO2014 project more coal-fired power plant retirements by 2016 than have been 
scheduled,” (February 14, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15031#. 
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reason that AURORA has not yet added MATS into its model and similarly, why this analysis did 
not attempt to do so manually. The full implications of this assumption are included in the 
Discussion section of this paper. AURORA includes a carbon price for all fossil units, in addition 
to those subject to RGGI, of $0.5 per ton starting in 2016.  The $0.5/ton price is built to attempt 
to account for anticipated regulations on carbon, precisely what this paper is exploring. To avoid 
redundancy, this carbon price was removed in the Basecase and all other scenarios. 
Policy Scenario – The primary scenario for this report models the effects of requiring mandatory 
heat rate reductions based on unit size. The achievable heat rate reductions which range from 
740 Btu/kWh and 810 Btu/kWh are based on the commercially available technology provided in 
Sargent and Lundy’s report. As Table 1 displays, there is a range of possible heat rate reductions 
and costs. The Policy Scenario, assumes median values of the range of heat rate improvements 
and costs presented in Table 1. In addition to the parameters laid out in the Basecase scenario, 
the Policy Scenario and additional side-scenarios include new fixed operation and maintenance 
costs and variable costs associated with the new technology starting in 2016 when the policy 
becomes effective. 
Sensitivity Analysis: This report explores four side scenarios which were run to test the policy’s 
sensitivity to uncertainty in retrofit costs and uncertainty in achievable heat rate reductions. For 
these four scenarios, the upper and lower bounds of Sargent and Lundy’s estimates were used 
(Table 1).  
 High Efficiency, High Cost Scenario - This scenario assumed the maximum possible heat 
rate reduction presented in the Sargent and Lundy’s report and the maximum retrofit cost 
to coal plants. Coal units would achieve between 1,105 Btu/kWh and 1,265 Btu/kWh at an 
initial capital costs are between $29.85 million and $83.55 million per unit based on the 
size of the unit. 
 High Efficiency, Low Cost Scenario – This model assumes that coal plants achieve the 
maximum possible heat rate reduction with the lowest retrofit cost.  Coal units would 
reduce heat rates between 1,105 Btu/kWh and 1,265 Btu/kWh and have associated costs 
of $14.35 million – $38.45 million per unit based on the unit size. 
 Low Efficiency, High Cost Scenario – This scenario assumes the minimum heat rate 
reduction presented in Sargent and Lundy’s report and the maximum retrofit cost to coal 
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plants. Efficiency would improve by 305 to 355 Btu/kWh in 2016. Initial capital costs are 
between $29.85 million and $83.55 million. 
 Low Efficiency, Low Cost Scenario – A final scenario assumes minimum heat rate reductions 
and minimum retrofit costs. Efficiency improves by 305 to 355 Btu/kWh and capital costs 
range between $14.35 million and $38.45 million. 
The primary policy scenario results in an average 8% reduction across the fleet. The Low and High 
Efficiency Scenarios result in 4% and 15% reductions, respectively. However, it should be noted that a 
report by the Environmental Protection Agency estimates that the range of heat rate reductions in the 
US coal fleet is narrower and only 4 to 9 percent.52 Under these assumptions, the High Efficiency 
scenarios are outside of the range and the primary Policy Scenario would be at the upper end of EPA’s 
estimate.  
Cost Assumptions  
Prior to inputting the capital costs from Sargent and Lundy into the model, they needed to be corrected 
to account for inflation, labor, and taxes. AURORA performs such calculations when determining the 
economics of building new resources.53 Each new resource, such as a wind turbine, pulverized coal unit, 
or natural gas combined cycle turbine has a different overnight cost, tax recovery period, project 
contingency, and debt equity percentage. AURORA assumes an inflation rate of 2.5%, federal tax of 35%, 
state tax of 5.9% and book life of 30 years for all technologies (Table 2).  
Table 2: Capital Cost Adjustment Parameters in AURORA 
Inflation Rate 2.50% 
Federal Tax Rate 35% 
State Tax Rate 5.90% 
Debt Return (Interest Rate) 7.50% 
Percentage of Capital as Debt 65% 
Equity Return 35% 
Book Life 30 years 
Tax Recovery Period 20 years using IRS MACRS Tax 
Depreciation Rate 
Project Contingency Factor 1.07 
Labor and Materials Percentage of 
Cost 
40% Labor, 60% Materials 
                                                          
52
 EPA’s analysis notes that specific constraints might make achievable heat-rate reductions closer to 2 to 5 
percent. See EPA, “Technical Support Document,” 16.  
53
 AURORAxmp includes an Excel worksheet titled “Capital Work Calculations,” which calculates the costs for each 
type of new resource prior to inputting the data into the model. See AURORAxmp Electrical Market Model (Version 
11.2.1001). 
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AURORA uses these values to calculate the capital carrying cost rate, which is then input into the 
model.54 Using the same worksheet that AURORA uses in its new resource calculations, the adjusted 
costs of the retrofits for coal plants in all regions in the Eastern Interconnection were found. It is 
assumed that the project contingency factor, debt return, and tax recovery values for the retrofits would 
be the same values that AURORA assumes for new coal power plants (Table 2). Costs were corrected for 
differences in wages based on the location, as AURORA does.55 
Furthermore, capital costs were converted into annual fixed operation and maintenance costs. This was 
done to fit the structural constraints of AURORA, which does not have a specific location to enter capital 
costs. These annual costs were extended from 2016 through the end of the model in 2030 since the 
payback period is 30 years. The final adjusted values for the Policy scenario are displayed in Table 3. The 
bolded values in Table 3 are the final values that were input into AURORA. There is a range of total 
combined capital and FOM costs due to varying labor costs depending on the region.  
Table 3: Final Retrofit Costs for Policy Scenario 
 
Capacity 
Less than or equal to 200 
MW 
Greater than 200 MW and 
less than or equal to 500 
MW Greater than 500 MW 
Heat Rate Reduction 
(Btu/kWh) 810 745 740 
Capital Cost ($2010) 23,450,000 40,450,000 61,000,000 
FOM ($/year) 405,000 621,500 850,000 
Variable Cost ($/year) 285,000 697,500 1,225,000 
Variable Cost ($/MWh) 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Adjusted Overnight Cost
56
  
($/kW) ($2010) 128.59 88.73 74.34 
Base Capital Carrying Cost  
($/MW-week)
57
  223.99 - 287.65 154.55 - 198.47 129.48 - 166.28 
FOM ($/MW-week) 37.15 - 47.70 22.81 - 29.29 22.24 - 17.32 
Total Combined Capital and 
FOM ($/MW-week)
58
 261.14 - 335.35 177.36 - $227.76 146.80 - 188.52 
                                                          
54
 Ibid. 
55
 AURORA bases its labor costs on EIA’s AEO2011 Regional Labor Multiplier found in the National Energy Modeling 
System. This is discussed in greater detail in  the AURORAxmp “Capital Work Calculations” worksheet.  
56
 This is the capital cost in $/kW assuming installation in 2016. 
57
 This is the overnight cost when adjusted for opportunity cost of capital and regional difference in cost of labor. 
58
 Finally, base capital carrying cost and FOM costs are combined to estimate the non-variable retrofit costs. 
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Results 
Heat Rate Reductions 
Heat rates for all coal units in the Eastern Interconnection predictably decrease in 2016 in response to 
the phasing in of the policy. Figure 2, which displays the heat rates of all coal units in the Eastern 
Interconnection by capacity, helps to explain what is happening. As one can see, the units with the 
highest capacity are the most efficient (meaning that they have the lowest heat rate). Among the larger 
capacity units, the heat rate appears to be between 10,000 and 11,000 Btu/kWh. However, as the units 
decrease in size, the net heat rate strays to the right. The smallest plants are also the least efficient. 
Starting in 2016, all coal units, regardless of their initial heat rate, lower their heat rate by 740 to 810 
Btu/kWh in the Policy Scenario. Figure 2 demonstrates that, contrary to a traditional command-and-
control standard, the least efficient plants do not face more severe penalties compared to the more 
efficient plants. They are still allowed to continue to operate, so long as they achieve the mandatory 
heat rate reduction.  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of coal units by heat rate 
Few units have heat rates greater than 16,000 Btu/kWh, but they are not operational close in both the 
Basecase and Policy Scenarios. For instance, the Menasha #3 and #4 units in Menasha, Wisconsin have 
heat rates of 22,698 Btu/kWh and 19,703 Btu/kWh, respectively. These units have not been functional 
since 2009 and AURORA removes them from the model in 2014. For this reason, these extremes are not 
included in Figure 2. Otherwise, it is easy to see the correlation between units in 2013 and the same unit 
at a lower heat rate in 2016. 
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The phase in of the policy drops the average net heat rate from 10,300 Btu/kWh to 9,504 Btu/kWh – a 
decrease of 8% over 2013 levels (Table 4). As expected, the Policy Scenario produces results close to the 
center of the range of observed efficiency improvements. In the High Efficiency scenarios, the full-load 
heat rate dropped to approximately 9,065 Btu/kWh, achieving a 12% reduction in the average heat rate 
in 2016. Low Efficiency Scenarios exhibit smaller decreases to between 9,921 and 9,873 Btu/kWh (Table 
4) or between 3.96% and 4.43%. After the initial phase-in, the average heat rate continues to decrease.  
By 2030, the average heat rate is 10.68% below the 2013 level in the Policy Scenario. The proposed 
policy does not require any heat rate reductions past 2016. Rather the decrease in heat rate is due to 
retirement of less efficient plants. Even in the Basecase Scenario, the average heat rate has decreased 
by 1.85% by 2030, demonstrating that some of these gains in the average heat rate would occur even 
absent 111(d) regulations. 
 
Table 4: Heat Rates in all scenarios 
Average Net 
Heat Rate 
(Btu/kWh) Basecase 
Policy 
Scenario 
High Efficiency Scenarios Low Efficiency Scenarios 
High Cost Low Cost High Cost Low Cost 
2013 10,332 10,332 10,332 10,332 10,332 10,332 
2016 10,284 9,505 9,064 9,071 9,874 9,921 
2020 10,195 9,341 8,913 9,042 9,784 9,812 
2025 10,184 9,259 8,829 8,977 9,675 9,692 
2030 10,162 9,229 8,799 8,940 9,644 9,662 
       
% Difference 
to 2013 in 
            2016 0.46% 8.01% 12.26% 12.19% 4.43% 3.96% 
2020 1.32% 9.60% 13.72% 12.47% 5.30% 5.02% 
2025 1.43% 10.38% 14.53% 13.10% 6.36% 6.18% 
2030 1.65% 10.68% 14.83% 13.47% 6.66% 6.48% 
Retrofit Costs 
Total average costs for all coal plants in the Eastern Interconnection increase in 2016. The retrofit cost in 
the Policy Scenario phases in at $2.57 million per year in 2016 and remains steady through 2030 (Figure 
3). Fixed operation and maintenance costs, which includes the retrofit cost, increased in the Policy 
Scenario from $6,335,146 per year to $8,734,101 per year.  
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Figure 3: Average Total Costs and Retrofit Costs 
The retrofit costs may seem significant, but they are relatively small in comparison to the total cost of 
operating a coal power plant. The initial capital cost estimates for the Policy Scenario were between $23 
and $61 million dollars, depending on the plant size (Table 3) but only equate to average payments of 
$2.57 million when paid back over a period of 30 years. As a result, retrofit costs are only about 5% of 
the total operational costs.  For instance, Allen #1, a 251 MW coal unit located in SERC paid $3,643,000 
in 2016 for costs associated with the retrofit but had a total operational cost of $64,639,839. The largest 
share of the operational cost is due to fuel which totaled $42,734,000 in 2016. Variable costs were 
$8,572,000, and fixed costs (including the retrofit costs) were $12,527,000. For this plant, the policy-
induced retrofit increases total cost of operation for the plant by 5.6%.  While the retrofit cost is 5% on 
average, the distribution of these costs is not equal across all coal plant sizes. These retrofit costs 
represent a more significant percentage of total costs for smaller plants than for larger plants (7.90% for 
units ≤200 MW; 5.57% for units >200 MW and ≤500 MW; 4.46% for units >500 MW in 2016). 
 
While fixed operation and maintenance costs increase, coal plants experience large reductions in fuel 
costs due to the heat rate improvements. This is apparent when looking at the cost per megawatt-hour 
(Figure 4). Because the cost per megawatt-hour is decreased in most scenarios, the cost increases 
displayed in Figure 3 do not actually portray the whole picture. The large improvement in fuel costs 
actually leads to an overall decrease in total costs per megawatt hour in the Policy scenario relative to 
the Basecase.  
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Figure 4: Costs per Megawatt-hour 
For Allen #1, fuel costs were $42,734,000 in 2016 but this is less than the unit paid in fuel costs in 2015 
despite producing more electricity in 2016 than in 2015 (Fuel costs in 2015 were $45,535,000). Allen #1 
only consumed 1.49 x 107 mmBtu of fuel in 2016 compared with 1.62 x 107 mmBtu in 2015.  
In the High Efficiency scenarios, like the Policy Scenario, total costs per megawatt-hour are reduced 
relative to the Basecase due to the gains in fuel efficiency and associated fuel costs (Figure 5). These 
reductions are even more pronounced in the High Efficiency Scenarios. Total costs per megawatt-hour in 
the High Efficiency Low Retrofit Cost scenario drop below $40/MWh in 2016. 
 
Figure 5: Total costs per megawatt-hour for all scenarios 
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However, in the Low Efficiency scenarios, the efficiency gains are not great enough to decrease total 
costs per megawatt-hour, therefore the total costs per megawatt-hour are greater than the Basecase. 
Costs in the low efficiency scenarios do eventually drop below the Basecase in 2022 as less efficient, 
more costly units are retired and replaced with other sources. All scenarios experience this decline in 
costs through 2022 associated with retirements and phase in of new resources. These impacts are 
discussed in subsequent sections.  
Electrical Generation:  
Electrical power generation from coal increases under the Policy Scenario relative to the Basecase. 
Reduced fuel costs and total costs per megawatt-hour from the installation of efficient technology 
makes it more economical for coal plants to operate. In Figure 3, total average costs increase, not 
necessarily because the retrofit increases total costs, but because coal plants are operating at higher 
capacities. That is why the cost per megawatt-hour provides a better understanding of what is 
happening. Table 5 displays the generation from coal units in the Eastern Interconnection. Generation 
under the Policy Scenario increases to 1,536 Terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2016 while generation only 
increases to 1,464 TWh under the Basecase – a difference of 5%.   
Table 5: Electrical Generation from Coal in the Eastern Interconnection (Net generation and percent generation above 
Basecase) 
Coal Output 
(TWh) 
Basecase Policy Scenario 
High Efficiency Low Efficiency 
High Cost Low Cost High Cost Low Cost 
2013 1,238 1,238 1,236 1,236 1,238 1,236 
2016 1,464 1,536 1,569 1,574 1,491 1,497 
% Difference 0% 4.96% 7.18% 7.51% 1.86% 2.25% 
2020 1,527 1,603 1,633 1,645 1,555 1,561 
% Difference 0% 4.96% 6.93% 7.70% 1.86% 2.20% 
2025 1,706 1,753 1,778 1,796 1,718 1,725 
% Difference 0% 2.76% 4.22% 5.27% 0.67% 1.11% 
2030 1,757 1,802 1,824 1,840 1,770 1,773 
% Difference 0% 2.58% 3.82% 4.72% 0.72% 0.89% 
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In the side-scenarios, the High Efficiency scenario increases output by 7.2-7.5% while Low Efficiency 
scenarios only increase output by 1.9-2.3%, regardless of the retrofit costs. This demonstrates that the 
change in output is directly correlated with the efficiency gains and not the associated with the retrofit 
costs. Under this policy, heat rate improvements influence a plant’s decision to operate rather than the 
costs since the costs are so low relative to the fuel efficiency gains. The direct relationship between 
efficiency and output can be seen in Figure 6. At higher heat rate improvements, coal plants will respond 
by increasing output. Lower heat rate improvements increase output less. While the relationship 
between output and efficiency appears linear, it is probably not so. There are diminishing returns to 
efficiency improvements because at some point, electrical demand will be met regardless of efficiency 
improvements among coal units. 
 
Figure 6: Relationship between Heat Rate Improvement and Output 
It is somewhat surprising that output in the Low Efficiency Scenarios increases despite the fact that the 
cost per megawatt-hour is higher in these scenarios relative to the Basecase. It would be expected that 
higher operation costs would depress coal generation. However, it may be that, under the Low 
Efficiency Scenarios, some units benefit while some experience increased costs. Efficiency gains might 
make it more economical for some units to operate at a higher capacity which would increase the 
output relative to the Basecase. Alternatively, a few units might experience substantially higher costs 
which would raise the average cost per megawatt-hour. This would explain why output increases 
despite the fact that operational costs are higher for the Low Efficiency Scenarios. The fact that the Low 
Efficiency High Cost scenario only increases output by 1.86% while the Low Efficiency Low Cost scenario 
increases output 2.25% supports this. Output is constrained when costs are higher while keeping 
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efficiency gains constant. However, this cannot be verified unless each unit is analyzed in a case-by-case 
basis. 
 
Because AURORA is an electrical dispatching model that balances load, increasing electrical generation 
from coal units requires decreases in output from other sources. Comparing the Policy Scenario to the 
Baseline, it is clear that increased coal output displaces natural gas (Figure 7). In Figure 7, one can see 
the ratio of change between natural gas and coal is nearly one-to-one. Natural gas makes up a larger 
share of the generation in the Basecase Scenario compared to the Policy Scenario.  
 
Figure 7: Difference in Output between Basecase and Policy Scenario 
Nuclear power and hydropower are significant sources of electricity in the Eastern Interconnection but 
do not exhibit significant differences in output in the Basecase and Policy Scenarios. This is because 
hydropower and nuclear are very cheap sources of power in the Eastern Interconnection, run at high 
capacity, and do not directly compete with coal markets. 
 
Similarly, if coal generation displaces natural gas generation, it can also displace coal generation from 
other regions. Under the Policy Scenario, coal generation in Canada actually decreases relative to the 
Basecase (Table 6). This negates concerns that regulation of coal units in the United States might result 
in emission leakage to Canada. Efficiency gains at coal plants in the US make Canadian generation less 
cost effective. However, even if coal costs increased in the United States relative to Canada, it is unlikely 
that much emission leakage would occur. Canada does not have adequate capacity to absorb much of 
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the US demand since Canadian coal capacity in the Eastern Interconnection totals 6,982 MW compared 
to 265,562 MW in the United States.  
Table 6: Canadian Coal Electrical Generation 
 
Canadian Coal Output (TWh) 
Basecase Policy Scenario 
2013 23.07 23.07 
2016 26.00 25.19 
% Difference 0% -3.21% 
2020 25.33 24.67 
% Difference 0% -2.67% 
2025 34.00 33.29 
% Difference 0% -2.12% 
2030 38.41 37.96 
% Difference 0% -1.19% 
 
By 2025 and 2030, the difference in coal output between the policy scenarios and the Basecase 
decrease. Both Table 5 and Figure 7 exhibit this trend. In 2016, the Policy Scenario produces 72 more 
TWh of coal-fired electricity than the Basecase Scenario, but by 2030, the difference has diminished to 
45 TWh. The decrease is influenced by new capacity coming online. 
New Capacity and Retirements:   
From 2013 through 2030, AURORA both adds new plants and retires old plants. In its long-term analysis, 
AURORA takes into account real levelized net present value to determine whether it is economical to 
retire an old plant and build a new plant. Any capacity that is retired must be balanced that by 
increasing the output of existing capacity or building new capacity. While AURORA allows for all types of 
power plants to be built, including coal, nuclear, solar, geothermal, wind, and natural gas, most options 
are cost prohibitive. In both the Basecase and Policy Scenario, the only units that AURORA adds are new 
natural gas units and wind power. New coal plants would have to be integrated gasification combined 
cycle (IGCC) units which are much more expensive than natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) turbines. In 
the Basecase Scenario, the Eastern Interconnection adds 94.6 GW of natural gas capacity through 2030 
while in the Policy Scenario, it adds 89 GW. By comparison, it adds 0.6 GW and 0.4 GW of wind, 
respectively. Less natural gas is added in the Policy Scenario because of the increased generation from 
coal units. The influx of new natural gas largely replaces coal. While generation of coal increases in all 
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scenarios through 2030, as the economy growth, the rate of growth in coal generation slows as new 
natural gas units become more abundant.  
 
Despite the fact that output from coal increases under the policy, there are coal units that retire. In the 
Policy Scenario, more coal units retire compared to the Basecase Scenario, specifically after the policy 
goes into effect (Figure 8). At the end of 2015, prior to new costs associated with the retrofits take 
effect, twelve more units retire in the Policy Scenario than do in the Basecase. Of the units that retire, 
most are already operating are very low or zero capacity. The United States has excess capacity of coal 
that is not regularly dispatched. In the Policy Scenario, some of this extra capacity is retired. The retrofits 
affect each unit differently since each has different operating costs, retrofit costs, and output. But units 
that not producing electricity would be impacted the most. It is more economical for them to retire than 
incur the retrofit costs. Under the Basecase Scenario, these units are kept on despite the fact that they 
do not produce much electricity, perhaps to serve as a reserve in case they are needed. An enhanced 
number of retirements continue in the Policy Scenario through 2026 and these are similarly, low and 
zero capacity units. While it does not make much sense that units would chose to retire in 2016, 2017, 
2018, and 2019 after already paying for the retrofits as Figure 8 displays, this may a constraint of the 
model. It might not be accurately capturing a unit-operator’s decision making.  
 
Figure 8: Retired Coal Units in Policy and Basecase 
The total capacity that is retired over the same period follows this same trend (Figure 9). The Policy 
Scenario results in 8.7 GW of retired capacity by 2030 where only 4.4 GW would be retired in the 
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Basecase. In both scenarios, much capacity is retired prior to 2015 and is associated with planned 
retirements of old plants (Figure 8 and Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9: Total Coal Units and Total Coal Capacity Retired (2013-2030) 
In some of the side scenarios, the effect is more pronounced. The Low Efficiency High Cost Scenario 
results in the most retirements (162 units through 2030), whereas the High Efficiency Low Cost scenario 
only retires 99 units. The High Efficiency Low Cost scenario has the least retirements due to a 
combination of two factors: low cost of retrofit technology and low fuel costs.  
A primary concern of a national regulation is its regional effects. Most of the United States coal-fired 
electrical generation is in the Reliability First Corporation and the SERC Reliability Corporation which, 
when combined, add up to 61.5% of coal-fired electrical generation in the U.S. and 75.3% of coal-fired 
generation in the Eastern Interconnection.59 The majority of the retirements associated with the policy 
occur in these regions, but this is not unreasonable given how many coal units are located there. The 
number of retirements seems proportional when viewed against the retirements that occur in the 
Basecase (Figure 10). 
                                                          
59
 EPA, “eGrid.” 
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Figure 10: Retirements by Region including Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO), NY (New York), PJM, ReliabilityFirst 
Corporation (RFC), SERC Reliability Corporation (SERC), and Southwest Power Pool (SPP) 
Electricity Prices: 
In Policy Scenario and the four side-scenarios, electricity prices are lower relative to the Basecase due to 
the lower costs per megawatt-hour for coal plants, but overall, prices are not dramatically different. 
Electricity prices in the Policy Case are $52.24 per MWh ($2010) in 2025 and $52.75 per MWh in the 
Basecase Scenario, a difference of $0.50 per MWh or 0.05 cents per kWh. Scenarios assuming high 
retrofit costs have higher electricity prices than the Policy Scenario but are still below the Basecase. This 
demonstrates that despite uncertainty in the true cost of the policy, there is confidence that it would 
not lead to higher electricity prices. Furthermore, improvements in efficiency conclusively drive prices. 
The average electricity price assuming high costs and high efficiency is cheaper than the electricity price 
assuming low costs and low efficiency (Table 7). Towards the end of the analysis, electricity prices in the 
policy scenario increase above those of the Basecase but again, this difference is small.   
Table 7: Electricity Prices in six scenarios 
Average 
Electricity Price 
($2010/MWh) Basecase Policy Scenario 
High Efficiency Low Efficiency 
High Cost Low Cost High Cost Low Cost 
2013 40.18 40.18 40.25 40.25 40.18 40.25 
2016 44.55 43.35 42.67 42.31 43.44 43.38 
2020 45.17 44.43 43.87 44.44 44.74 44.54 
2025 52.75 52.24 51.61 51.94 52.32 52.12 
2030 55.91 56.21 55.42 55.20 56.67 55.55 
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Carbon Emissions and Effective Carbon Price: 
The policy succeeds in reducing emissions relative to the Basecase. In 2016, emissions in the Eastern 
Interconnection are 4.1% below the Basecase a difference of 68 Megatons (Mt) (Table 8). The side-
scenarios also succeed in reducing emissions relative to the Basecase. Scenarios assuming higher 
efficiency lower emissions between 6.2 and 6.7% in 2020. The Low Efficiency scenarios only result in 
reductions of 2.0% relative to the Basecase. Because all four side-scenarios are consistent, this 
demonstrates that the policy lower carbon emissions even in uncertainty about efficiency and retrofit 
costs. 
Table 8: Carbon Emissions in US Eastern Interconnection in Megatons (Mt) 
US EI Carbon 
Emissions Basecase (Mt) 
Policy 
Scenario (Mt) 
High Efficiency (Mt) Low Efficiency (Mt) 
High Cost Low Cost High Cost Low Cost 
2016 
                                                
1,664  
                            
1,596  
                
1,555  
                 
1,557  
                      
1,628  
                      
1,631  
% Difference 0% -4.1% -6.6% -6.4% -2.2% -2.0% 
2020 
                                                
1,763  
                            
1,692  
                
1,646  
                 
1,653  
                      
1,725  
                      
1,728  
% Difference 0% -4.0% -6.7% -6.2% -2.1% -2.0% 
2025 
                                                
1,974  
                            
1,874  
                
1,821  
                 
1,831  
                      
1,919  
                      
1,924  
% Difference 0% -5.1% -7.8% -7.2% -2.8% -2.5% 
2030 
                                                
2,099  
                            
1,997  
                
1,940  
                 
1,948  
                      
2,047  
                      
2,046  
% Difference 0% -4.9% -7.6% -7.2% -2.5% -2.5% 
 
Emissions remain below the Basecase Scenario through 2030 despite the fact that overall emissions 
increase due to economic activity and population growth. The consistent reduction in emissions results 
in a substantial amount of cumulative avoided emissions when added up over the lifespan of the policy. 
Figure 11 displays the emissions under the Policy and Basecase Scenarios. The area between the two 
lines represents the number of avoided tons of carbon dioxide emissions. By 2030, under the Policy 
Scenario, 1,284 Mt of carbon dioxide were avoided. 
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Figure 11: Eastern Interconnection Emissions 
Despite the reductions, these results are not all positive. Emissions continue to grow as will ambient 
concentrations of carbon dioxide. The Obama Administration has committed to reducing US emissions 
17% below 2005 levels by 2020 and views regulating carbon dioxide from power plants is a primary tool 
to achieve that goal.60 While regulations under the Clean Air Act should not (and must not) be crafted 
with political commitments in mind, this report briefly explored whether this policy option would be 
able to meet the President’s goal. In 2016, emissions in the Eastern Interconnection drop to 16.6% 
below 2005 levels. However, by 2020, emissions are only 11.7% below 2005 levels due to increasing 
economic activity. In 2030, emissions are projected to be 4.31% above 2005 levels. Furthermore, in the 
Basecase Scenario, emissions in 2016 are already 13.1% below 2005 without the policy. The emission 
gap between 2005 levels and the scenarios’ projections is mostly due to a decrease in economic activity 
from the 2008 recession. Based on data from the Energy Information Administration, total energy-
related emissions in 2011 were 8% below 2005 levels61 and those from the electricity sector were 10% 
below 2005 levels.62 Policy only decreases emissions by an additional few percentage points over the 
business-as-usual case.  
 
                                                          
60
 White House, “The President’s Climate Action Plan,” (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf. 
61
 EIA, “U.S. Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 2012,” (last updated October 21, 2013), 
http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/carbon/.  
62
 EIA, “Table 9.1 Emissions from Energy Consumption at Conventional Power Plants and Combined-Heat-and-
power Plants,” (accessed April 17, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_09_01.html. 
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Part of the reason that emissions continue to rise is that the policy does not put a steady price on 
carbon dioxide. Calculating the effective price that the policy places on carbon emissions was difficult. 
Dividing the price of the retrofit by the difference in carbon emissions between the Basecase and Policy 
Scenarios is not sufficient since it does not take into account the efficiency gains that reduce costs. 
When the benefits of reduced fuel consumption are taken into account, the effective price of carbon is 
$40 per ton in 2016 ($2010). The effective price fluctuates annually but trends toward lower prices 
through 2019. The price is $19.7 per ton in 2019 ($2010). The price drops to zero by 2020 as the total 
cost per megawatt-hour in the Policy Scenario diverges from the Basecase as shown in Figure 4.  
Discussion: 
Implementing a mandatory heat-rate reduction for all coal plants in the United States, such as the one 
analyzed in this report, has its benefits and drawbacks. The policy is legally robust compared to some of 
the more flexible alternatives as discussed in the Background. It would represent a less ambitious course 
of action to reduce carbon emissions while allowing easily achievable reductions to take place at low 
economic costs.  By 2020, annual emissions are 71.4 million metric tons below BAU and continue to 
diverge so that by 2030, the United States Eastern Interconnection is emitting 102 million metric tons 
fewer annually. As discussed above, the cumulative effects of these emissions reductions can be great 
(see Figure 11). While the policy comes close to meeting the Administration’s political emissions 
commitments, it falls short, and most of the progress towards a 17% reduction below 2005 levels 
originates from economic activity outside the influence of the policy.63 
 
The policy’s effectiveness is not consistent for several reasons. First, it does not fix a steady price on 
carbon that accurately factors in the externalities of carbon dioxide. Secondly, it does not encourage 
shifting from coal power to other low-carbon or renewable energy. Part of the benefit of the policy is 
that it has low economic costs to consumers and unit operators. Retrofit costs are low relative to the 
total operational cost of a coal power plant. But the drawback is that the retrofit costs associated with 
the mandatory heat rate reduction are still not enough to make solar, geothermal, or wind power 
economical. As a result, when the economy grows, the only option is to increase coal and natural gas 
generation which leads to higher emissions. Furthermore, the policy allows inefficient plants to continue 
                                                          
63
 EIA’s projections have US energy-related emissions 9% below 2005 levels by 2020 assuming no additional 
policies. This projection includes expected decreases in carbon-intensity of non-electrical sectors such as 
transportation. My estimates bring the total reductions to 12.8% by 2020. I calculated this by adding EIA’s 9% to 
the difference between my Basecase and Policy scenario. 
32 
 
to operate so long as they achieve the emission reduction. For economic impacts, this is a good thing; 
unit retirements are not severe and not substantially unfairly-distributed.64 The efficiency gains realized 
by coal plants leads to increased coal capacity and lowered electricity prices. This phenomenon supports 
other analyses which found a rebound effect of 13-18% in output for an associated 4% decrease in heat 
rate.65 
 
There is cause for concern in both the assumptions and modeling constraints. First, it is unlikely that 
these efficiency gains would take place in 2016. Even if fast-tracked, guidelines for implementation 
would not likely be finalized before June 30, 2016,66 which does not even taken into account how long it 
would take for plants to comply. The effect is that the US would be less likely to meet a 17% reduction 
by 2020. However, other than that, there are no anticipated impacts of the policy being delayed by a 
few years. 
 
As discussed in the Methods section, the range of reductions used in this report are based on the 
technologies included in Sargent and Lundy’s analysis, but these reductions may be overly optimistic. 
The EPA estimated the range of possible improvements to yield heat rate decreases between 4% and 9% 
but realistic expectations are closer to 2-5% given “site-specific constraints.”67 Other analyses have 
assumed a 4% reduction rate was feasible.68 Because technology presented in Sargent and Lundy’s 
report is already commercially viable, it is likely that more than a few of the coal plants have already 
installed the technology. Furthermore, if installing the technology actually decreases fuel costs and 
makes it more economical to increase output, coal units should already be taking advantage of this. 
Sargent and Lundy’s report only estimates potential improvements and does not list unit by unit 
efficiency gains and costs. To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the actual 
opportunities that exist for efficiency improvements. In this analysis, it is assumed that all coal plants in 
                                                          
64
 While more closures occur in coal heavy areas, it is more equal than other analyses: Tarr, Jeremy, “Regulating 
Carbon Dioxide under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act.”  
65
 Linn, Joshua, Erin Mastrangelo, and Dallas Burtraw, “Regulating Greenhouse Gases from Coal Power Plants 
under the Clean Air Act,” Resources for the Future (February 2013), http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-13-
05.pdf. 
66
 White House, “Presidential Memorandum: Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards,” (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/presidential-memorandum-power-sector-carbon-
pollution-standards. 
67
 EPA “Technical Support Document,” 16. 
68
 Burtraw, Dallas, and Matthew Woerman, “Technology Flexibility and Stringency.”  
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the Eastern Interconnection would achieve the same heat rate reductions despite this fact therefore the 
efficiency gains are likely overstated.  
 
Part of what would deter coal plants from taking advantage of such efficiency gains are other 
environmental regulations. Whenever a stationary source undertakes major modifications, the Clean Air 
Act stipulates that it becomes subject to New Source Review (NSR). In most cases, existing sources are 
exempt from high standards for new sources, but when New Source Review is triggered an existing 
power plant would have to upgrade to meet the current standards of best available control technology 
for all air pollution regulations.69 This would incur costs above what is taken into account in this analysis. 
In its recommendations to the EPA, Pennsylvania requested that the agency revise its rules for NSR so 
that any action under 111(d) does not trigger it.70 If such a policy regarding NSR were adopted, the EPA 
would have to take a hard look at whether exempting retrofits in compliance with greenhouse gas 
standards would be legal under the CAA.  
 
In addition to leaving out with costs associated with NSR, other costs are not included in the analysis. As 
was noted above, AURORAxmp does not include any costs associated with the Mercury  and Air Toxics 
Standard (MATS) which take effect in 2015. Part of the challenge of estimating costs for MATS is that 
there is a wide range of what coal plants require to comply. Costs for MATS are estimated to be 
between $3/kW and $269/kW71 dependent on the emission control technologies that the plant already 
has installed, its size, fuel source, and efficiency.  MATS is expected to result in substantial power plant 
closures. The EIA estimates that 20 GW of coal will retire between 2014 and 2016, partially due to 
MATS. Other analyses predict between 10 and 66 GW of retirements by 2015 due to MATS and other 
standards.72 By comparison, the business-as-usual case in AURORA only predicts 2.6 GW will retire 
between 2013 and 2016. If MATS were properly taken into account in the model, the added cost of the 
mandatory heat-rate reduction might force more coal plants into retirement or make other forms of 
electrical generation economical.  
                                                          
69
 Tarr, Jeremy, “Regulating Carbon Dioxide under Section 111(d).” 
70
 Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, “Recommended Framework for the Section 111(d) 
Emissions Guidelines Addressing Carbon Dioxide Standards for Existing Fossil Fuel-Fired Power Plants,” (April 10, 
2014), https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B4Y3VQLxjkxOd05jaWE4ZktjWXc/edit. 
71
 EPA, “Performance and Cost of Mercury and Multipollutant Emission Control Technology Applications on Electric 
Utility Boilers,” (October 2003), http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/P1000G5O.pdf. 
72
 Macedonia, Jennifer “Environmental Regulation and Electric System Reliability.”  
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Conclusion: 
Despite the many assumptions associated with the analysis, I am confident that the policy provides a 
good projection of what would result from a mandatory heat-rate reduction under the EPA. The 
sensitivity analyses of the policy demonstrate that the policy would perform as functioned even if there 
is uncertainty in the true cost and availability for reductions. The policy reflects what the EPA could 
accomplish if it took a strict, within-the-fence-line approach to regulation under 111(d). However, 
convention wisdom indicates that this is not the avenue that the EPA will choose. Given the 
Administration’s prioritization of climate change, it is most likely that the final policy under 111(d) will 
be more ambitious and include some of the flexibility proposed in other analyses. Indeed, that might be 
the correct course of action given the pressing need for cuts in carbon emissions. Regardless, testing the 
efficacy of mandatory heat-rate reduction provides a good baseline to compare other proposals and 
could serve as a sound option if other alternatives fail. 
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Appendix I 
 
 
 
  200 MW 500 MW 900 MW 
Technologies Heat Rate 
 Capital 
Cost ($ 
million) 
FOM 
($/yr) 
Variable 
Cost ($/yr) Heat Rate 
 Capital 
Cost ($ 
million) 
FOM 
($/yr) 
Variable 
Cost 
($/yr) Heat Rate 
 Capital 
Cost ($ 
million) 
FOM 
($/yr) 
Variable 
Cost ($/yr) 
Boiler Island                         
Boiler Operations 50 - 100 $2 - $3 $50,000 - 50 - 100 $4 - $5 $100,000 - 50 - 100 $7 - $8 $150,000 - 
Neural Network 50 - 150 $0.50  $50,000 - 30 - 100 $0.75  $50,000 - 0 - 50 $0.75  $50,000 - 
Sootblower 30 - 150 $0.30  $50,000 - 30 - 90 $0.50  $50,000 - 30 - 90 $0.50  $50,000 - 
Air Heater Leakage 10 - 40 
$0.3 - 
$0.5 $50,000 - 10 - 40 
$0.6 - 
$0.7 $75,000 - 10 - 40 $1 - $1.2 $100,000 - 
Air Heater Temperature 50 - 120 
$1.5 - 
$3.5 $50,000 
$170,000 
- 
$350,000 50 - 120 
$2.5 - 
$10 $75,000 
$425,00
0 - 
$850,00
0 50 - 120 
$3.5 - 
$18 $100,000 
$750,000 - 
$1,500,000 
Turbine Island                         
Turbine Overhaul 100 - 300 $2 - $12 - - 
100 - 
300 $4 - $20 - - 100 - 300 $5 - $25 - - 
Condenser 30 - 70 - $30,000 - 30 - 70 - $60,000 - 30 - 70 - $80,000 - 
Boiler Feed Pumps 25 - 50 
$0.25 - 
$0.35 - - 25 - 50 
$0.5 - 
$0.6 - - 25 - 50 
$0.7 - 
$0.8 - - 
Flue Gas System                         
ID Fans or Variable 
Frequency Drives 10 - 150 $6 - $6.5 
$25,000 - 
$50,000 - 10 - 150 $9 - $11 
$38,000 - 
$85,000 - 10 - 150 $15 - $16 
$60,000 - 
$130,000 - 
Emissions Control 
Technologies                         
FGD System 0 - 50 $0 - $1 
$0 - 
$50,000 - 0 - 50 $0 - $3 
$0 - 
$100,000 - 0 - 50 $0 - $5 
$0 - 
$150,000 - 
Particulate Control 
System 0 - 5 $0 - $0.2 
$0 - 
$25,000 - 0 - 5 $0 - $0.5 
$0 - 
$25,000 - 0 - 5 $0 - $0.8 
$0 - 
$25,000 - 
SCR System 0 - 10 $0 - $0.5 
$0 - 
$25,000 $25,000 0 - 10 $0 - $1 
$0 - 
$50,000 $60,000 0 - 10 $0 - $2 
$0 - 
$100,000 $100,000 
Water Treatment 
System                         
Advanced Cooling 
Tower  0 - 70 $1.5 
$0 - 
$75,000 - 0 - 70 $3  
$0 - 
$125,000 - 0 - 70 $5 - $5 
$0 - 
$175,000 - 
TOTAL 
355 - 
1265 
$14.35 - 
$29.85 
$305,000 
- 
$505,000 
$195,000 
- 
$375,000 
335 - 
1155 
$24.85 - 
$56.05 
$448,000 
- 
$795,000 
$485,00
0 - 
$910,00
0 
 305 - 
1105  
$38.45 - 
$83.55 
$590,000 
- 
$111,000
0 
$850,000 - 
$1,600,000 
